INTRODUCTION
Sales and licenses of intellectual property (IP) and products incorporating IP often feature restrictions on use, transfer, and production. 1 IP owners have considerable freedom to fashion such restrictions, but they are constrained by contract and antitrust law as well as by certain doctrines within IP law. 2 The appropriate rigor of the constraints on the freedom of IP owners to market as they choose is hotly contested within law and economics.
3 Most commentary on this subject focuses on antitrust oversight, but -at least when it comes to vertical restraints 4 -constraints that are internal to patent and copyright law are far more important. This Article moves beyond antitrust and explores the extensive regulation of vertical restraints within IP law. 5 There are four important reasons to focus on IP oversight of vertical restraints separately from antitrust oversight. First, IP law covers a broader range of vertical restraints. It has broader coverage because it responds to a -------------------Fourth, because IP law uses different instruments it possibly offers more effective regulation of vertical restraints, and should be used to complement antitrust regulation. 19 IP law frequently offers two cost advantages over antitrust: less difficulty fashioning an appropriate remedy; 20 and lower rent-seeking costs from opportunistic or anticompetitive litigation. 21 Let me illustrate the advantages of IP law by considering the regulation of price discrimination. Regulation through antitrust requires a court to identify anti-competitive price discrimination, specify unacceptable pricing practices in great detail, and monitor compliance. In contrast, IP law indirectly regulates price discrimination by encouraging or discouraging arbitrage, e.g., the Supreme Court recently discouraged geographic price discrimination by refusing to allow copyright owners to block importation of lawful copyright protected products into the United States. 22 The Court could have reached either decision, and thereby promoted or discouraged price discrimination without imposing much of an
-------------------
17 Some argue that competition is different in high-tech markets because market power is transitory in the face of the gale of creative destruction. Others argue that IP should be expanded and antitrust contracted to provide greater incentives for innovation. Cf. Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 453, 465 (2001) (explaining the expansion of IP rights was motivated by a desire to redistribute income in favor of IP owners) 18 See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 64. Bowman contends that such arrangements simply maximize legitimate profit attributable to the patent and should not be condemned through application of the leverage fallacy. Id. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §20. . 19 Antitrust is difficult to administer in hi-tech markets because trials are slow and the technology is difficult for the court to understand. IP law shares these administrative costs. See Joskow, supra note 11 at 99 (antitrust enforcement agencies do a much better job performing complex economic analysis than antitrust trial courts). 20 Crafting timely and precise antitrust remedies is a tough job in high-tech industries. See id. (antitrust remedies may fail to improve efficiency or even make matters worse); id. at 113-14 (reviewing an FTC study that casts doubt on the ability of antitrust enforcement agencies to formulate effective divestiture policies); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976) 88-91 (explaining social cost of divestiture as an antitrust remedy); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 77-80 (2000) (divestiture and conduct-based remedies are difficult to implement effectively); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 535, 547 (2001) (remedies should be designed so they do not undermine innovation, with a brief duration where appropriate, and to assure access to a bottleneck product or service). 21 For discussion of the rent-seeking costs associated with private antitrust litigation see POSNER, supra note 20, at 231-32 (supporting fee-shifting to successful defendants and restrictions of treble damages in antitrust suits); William J. Baumol & Janus A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J. LAW & ECON. 247, 250-51 (1985) ("the social costs of rent-seeking protectionism can be very high"). 22 See Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
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VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND IP LAW 5 administrative burden. Rent-seeking through litigation is more of a problem with antitrust regulation of price discrimination because any rule determining what sort of price discrimination is anti-competitive is likely to be quite uncertain. In contrast, the rule about importation of copyrighted works is relatively certain. Uncertainty about liability encourages opportunistic antitrust suits and possibly chills legitimate pricing decisions by sellers. 23 Concern about administrative costs and rent-seeking pushed the courts to restrict antitrust oversight of vertical restraints. 24 IP law can be used to regulate vertical restraints more extensively because it better avoids these costs. 25 This Article is structured into sections that discuss six types of vertical restraints: restrictions on the field or location of use; restrictions on sharing; control over the frequency of use; restrictions on repair and modification; packaging requirements; and impediments to a buyer's decision to exit its relationship with a seller. Each section explains how the restraint is regulated by IP law. Where appropriate, the antitrust treatment of the restraint is compared to the IP treatment. Finally, the policy issues presented by each restraint are described. The conclusion compares the effectiveness of IP law and antitrust law as instruments for regulating vertical restraints.
I. TYPE OF USE
In markets protected by IP, sellers often segment their buyers based on line of business, location, field of technology, or whether the use is not-forprofit. 26 They implement this segmentation through contract terms that specify allowable uses. The usual goal of this marketing strategy is price discrimination. 27 Price discrimination occurs when a seller charges ------------------- 23 See Joskow, supra note 11, at 98-99. Antitrust policy must send clear signals. It is designed to deter bad behavior -not to "scrutinize, screen, or approve firm behavior or market structures." Id. 24 See id. at 98 (antitrust law should not be used to regulate most market imperfections because of the high transaction costs associated with such "mircromanagement" Whether price discrimination is profitable depends on the cost of sorting customers into appropriate classes and the cost of blocking arbitrage. In this context, arbitrage occurs when a customer in a class that is supposed to pay a high price is able to obtain a product or license at a low price. A common source of arbitrage is the resale market -a favored customer purchases at a low price and resells to a disfavored customer. Arbitrage also occurs when a customer violates a use restriction and the seller fails to stop the violation.
Price discriminating sellers try to block arbitrage by restricting resale and by restricting the type of use allowed by favored customers. Sellers can sue users for breach of contract when they violate license restrictions. Various IP law doctrines increase the profitability of price discrimination by further discouraging arbitrage. If the act of arbitrage also violates an IP right, then sellers can bring more potent infringement claims in addition to contract claims against arbitrageurs. 30 Furthermore, the IP claims are available against arbitrageurs who are strangers to the seller, thereby overcoming the privity limitation on contract claims.
31
IP law generally facilitates restrictions on types of use, but its effect on resale restrictions is mixed -sometimes facilitating and sometimes discouraging resale restrictions. The baseline rule in patent and copyright law gives buyers the right to transfer products that they purchase. IP owners can avoid this rule, called the first sale or exhaustion doctrine, by leasing rather than selling their products.
--------------------------------
Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986) (price discrimination in the market for academic journals); Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 80-90 (describing the pervasive role of copyright law in both facilitating and impeding price discrimination). 28 Resale across national borders is treated distinctly from domestic resale. Copyright provides an importation right but it is limited by the first sale doctrine. 33 The copyright owner can block unauthorized imports, but cannot block authorized copies that are imported back into the U.S. 34 This forces a copyright owner to rely on contract law to block arbitrage against geographic price discrimination. Trademark law provides similar treatment of so-called gray market goods. 35 A United States trademark holder may bar the importation of goods bearing the same trademark when manufactured by a foreign manufacturer but cannot stop importation of goods made under the control of the domestic trademark holder. 36 In contrast, the Patent Act prohibits any importation of a patented product into the U.S, and greatly facilitates geographic price discrimination.
37
Patent law broadly facilitates restrictions on type of use while copyright gives more limited support. A patent owner has the right to exclude others from use of a patented invention. The predominant view in patent law states that because the patent owner can exclude all use, the statute gives an implied right to grant permission for some uses and still sue the licensee for infringement if she engages in an unauthorized use.
38
Copyright law enumerates certain uses that are the exclusive right of the copyright owner. Most relevant for this discussion of vertical restraints is the public performance right. 39 This right facilitates price discrimination in the movie and music markets between home users and buyers who want to engage in a public performance, e.g., exhibiting a movie in a theater or 666-67 (2000) . 37 See Section 271(a). Section 271(g) also prohibits importation of a product made with a patented process, even if the process was used outside of the U.S. with permission. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000) . 38 See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 140-42 (arguing that an absolute right to exclude use implies a right to impose any conditions on the use of a patented invention); Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1846 (arguing against this view and claiming it "has gradually fallen into disfavor in the patent-antitrust context"). The implied right is made explicit regarding restrictions on location of use. See 35 U.S.C.
§261. 39 Section 106(4) gives music composition copyright owners the right to control public performance of their music. See 17 U.S.C. §106(4). broadcasting music on the radio.
40
Compared to IP law, antitrust oversight of price discrimination is relatively passive. Antitrust plaintiffs had some success in the 1960s. In one notable case the owner of a patent on shrimp peeling machinery leased machines to Gulf Coast shrimp companies for half the rental rate that it charged Pacific Coast shrimp companies. 41 The Fifth Circuit found this geographic price discrimination violated Section Five of the FTC Act because it injured competition in the shrimp canning business. 42 Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley doubt the case would have come out the same way today. 43 They review recent cases and conclude that antitrust law permits price discrimination in patent licenses, but the sale of patented goods is still governed by the Robinson-Patman Act. 44 The RobinsonPatman Act is also occasionally applied to goods that incorporate copyrighted expression, like books and video cassettes, 45 but it has not had much impact on IP protected markets.
46
Patent and copyright law permit contract restrictions based on location and type of use, but patent law goes further than copyright law to encourage sellers to impose those restrictions by creating a strong importation right and a broad right to control use of a patented invention. To assess the economic significance of these differences one needs to examine the social welfare effects of these restraints. A common view among antitrust commentators is that sellers segment customer classes to achieve some distributional efficiency. 47 The same argument is pressed by copyright and trademark owners who oppose importation of gray market goods. 48 They argue exclusive territories are established to encourage investment by distributors in local goodwill and service. 49 The empirical evidence suggests, however, that gray markets arise to arbitrage geographic price discrimination. 50 Thus, the relevant policy issue is whether IP law should encourage geographic, field of use, and similar forms of price discrimination.
IP scholars have developed a recent fascination with the policy effects of price discrimination in IP-protected markets.
51 Some embrace price discrimination because it has the potential to increase profit and the incentive to create, and simultaneously increase output. Others are skeptical because of its distributional implications, or because it may actually cause output to fall. 52 It is possible that patent law's greater solicitude for price discrimination is explained by the perception that the extra profit from price discrimination is especially valuable as an incentive to invent (specifically to invent pharmaceuticals, an industry that practices extensive price discrimination 53 ). Perhaps the same incentive argument is not as persuasive in copyright protected markets.
Two other policy considerations are important in shaping optimal IP policy. First, any decision to expand the scope of IP rights increases the social costs associated with opportunistic and anti-competitive IP litigation. Converting a simple contract claim into a patent or copyright infringement claim gives the IP owner significant strategic advantages because of the threat of preliminary and permanent injunction, fee-shifting, and treble . Such an efficiency justification was raised by the copyright owner in Quality King, but it was not very persuasive. The empirical evidence establishes that geographic price discrimination is common and is probably the most important cause of gray market transactions. 50 See id. at 6 (explaining that empirical evidence shows that price discrimination is probably the most important cause of gray market transactions); David A. damages for willful infringement. 54 Furthermore, IP rights can be asserted against innocent strangers (perhaps importers) who might be vulnerable to an opportunistic IP suit. These rent-seeking costs need to be balanced against any incentive benefit before IP rights are expanded to support price discrimination.
Second, IP law can channel sellers into choosing a socially beneficial form of price discrimination rather than a socially harmful form.
55
Copyright's public performance right serves this function. If the public performance right were deleted from the statute, music and movie producers would find another, more costly, way to discriminate between buyers intending to publicly perform the work, and buyers intending only private use. One possibility would be a very high initial sales price followed after a significant delay with a lower sales price targeted at home users. Another possibility would be vertical integration into movie exhibition or radio broadcast. The public performance right allows discrimination and avoids the high implementation costs associated with the other strategies.
A related point is that copyright can shape the distributional effects of price discrimination by building exemptions into a right. Section 110 provides various exemptions to the public performance right to promote educational and nonprofit performances, 56 and other exemptions that might be explained by relatively high transaction costs compared to the value of the public performance to the user. 57 Thus, copyright effectively supports price discrimination to the bulk of users intending a public performance, while sheltering certain users to advance various policy goals.
Appropriately, antitrust regulation of type of use restraints is quite limited. Hovenkamp contends that: "[T]he costs of preventing price discrimination without any accompanying exclusionary conduct would almost certainly outweigh any benefits, particularly if the market is competitive or oligopolistic." 58 The basic difficulty with the RobinsonPatman approach is that it puts courts in an uncomfortable position as price regulators. In contrast, IP law works in the background by encouraging or discouraging arbitrage. 
-------------------

II. LENDING AND PRIVATE REPRODUCTION
Copyright law has been racked by controversies regarding the rights of buyers and sellers with regard to sharing. Even use of the term sharing is controversial.
60 I use it to describe various types of coalitions formed by consumers for consumption of copyrighted works. I define sharing as any activity such that a single copy of a work provides utility to a small number of end users in addition to the purchaser. This section addresses two common sources of sharing: lending and private reproduction.
61
Copyright law displays much ambivalence toward sharing. It would seem that private reproduction runs afoul of the reproduction right specified in Section 106(1), but many forms of private reproduction are privileged by statutory exemptions or the fair use defense.
62 It would also seem that buyers are permitted to lend copies that they purchase under the first sale doctrine, but that right is limited by amendments that preclude commercial lending of music and software. 63 Regulation of sharing is further complicated by enforcement problems. Copyright law recognizes the difficulty of enforcement against small scale sharing, and allows copyright owners to sue parties who contribute to copyright infringement by providing reproduction technology or otherwise facilitating illicit sharing.
64
Library lending is the oldest significant source of sharing. The first sale doctrine gives libraries the right to lend books and other copyrighted material in their collections. 65 But the nature of library sharing may soon change drastically as libraries incorporate more digital content into their collections. The contracts governing the transactions for digital content usually include terms that restrict transfer. The copyright owners argue that the first sale doctrine does not apply to digital transactions because they license rather than sell their products. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act and some cases approve of this theory. In other cases courts characterize the purported licenses as sales and refuse to enforce the resale restrictions.
66
The music and software industries obtained copyright amendments that bar unauthorized commercial music and software rental. 67 A puzzling contrast in U.S. copyright law is that commercial video rental is permitted without permission from movie copyright owners. The movie industry was not successful when it lobbied for an amendment comparable to the amendments obtained by the music and software industries. 68 In many other countries, copyright law does give copyright owners control over movie rental. 69 The introduction of reproduction technology to consumer markets made private reproduction another significant source of sharing. The photocopier added a new dimension to library-based sharing; now patrons can reproduce a portion of a text in addition to borrowing a text. Much photocopying does not infringe copyright because of the fair use doctrine or because of statutory exemptions for libraries. 70 The fair use doctrine is a multi-factor balancing test that allows copying that achieves certain socially desirable purposes provided the effect on copyright owners' incentives are not too severe. Spontaneous, non-commercial, and academic photocopying tends to be fair. Systematic and commercial photocopying tends to be infringing. 71 Consumers share music and video by making and exchanging private copies. Such sharing has become routine, but the first important case on the question was hotly disputed and decided by a five to four vote in the Supreme Court. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios the Court held private copying of television programs may be a fair use. 72 Specifically, it is fair use for consumers to videotape television programs
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND IP LAW 13 so they can view them at some time after the broadcast. 73 Many other countries initially found such copying was infringing, and then revised their copyright statutes to allow private copying, but they also collect taxes on recording media and devices and give the tax revenue to copyright owners. 74 The much publicized Napster case indicates some of the limits on personal reproduction rights. 75 The Ninth Circuit found that personal reproduction and exchange of digital music files over an anonymous Internet file-sharing service is not fair use. 76 Additionally, the court ruled the company Napster was indirectly liable for copyright infringement because it provided software and services that facilitated unlawful filesharing. 77 In contrast, Sony was not liable for the sale of video recorders. Although video recorders can be used to make unlawful copies, since they are capable of a substantial non-infringing use, there is no contributory infringement.
78
The antitrust approach to regulation of sharing asks whether vertical restraints on private reproduction and transfer cause anti-competitive effects to distributors or potential competitors in downstream markets. The answer in most of the interesting cases is clearly no, thus there is not much of a role for antitrust. 79 In contrast, economic analysis of copyright law asks what pattern of rights relating to sharing maximizes expected total surplus. This question must be answered by copyright law (at least implicitly) because the law must set some pattern of entitlements.
Optimal policy toward sharing tries to satisfy two goals that are often in conflict: provide an appropriate incentive for the creation of copyrighted works, and maximize total surplus from dissemination of these products once they are created. A policy that always forbids sharing without permission is probably not optimal. It does have the desirable effect of maximizing the incentive for creation. But a right to share may be socially desirable because the current incentive for creation is too large, or because giving users the right to share causes total surplus to grow significantly relative to the loss of profit-based incentive. 80 Normally, when sharing raises both profit and ex post surplus it is socially desirable and should be encouraged, and similarly, it should be discouraged when it depresses both profit and ex post surplus. 81 When sharing erodes profit and raises ex post surplus the optimal policy is hard to determine, but encouraging sharing is more likely to be socially desirable when the surplus gain is large and the profit loss is small. 82 The effect of sharing on profit depends to a large extent on how sharing affects demand for the copyrighted work. Sharing affects demand by reducing the number of buyers, increasing the valuations that buyers assign to the product, and lowering or avoiding transaction costs. Valuations rise because most buyers value the opportunity to share in addition to the opportunity to consume the product directly. 83 In some
music file-sharing service Kazaa sued members of the music industry for copyright misuse and antitrust violations and is seeking to bar enforcement of their music copyrights. Id. The claim is based on the music industry's alleged refusal to provide copy-protected music files for distribution over the Kazaa network. Id. The district court judge in the Napster case found evidence that the music industry might have violated the antitrust laws in the market for digital music distribution. Id. The Department of Justice is also investigating music industry activities in markets for digital music. Id. 80 The Ninth Circuit in Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9 th Cir. 1981), and the dissent in the Supreme Court decision that reversed the Ninth Circuit, 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) argued that the fair use doctrine should never apply to reproductive uses of copyrighted works that enable some types of sharing. The majority rejected this view stating that even some unauthorized time-shifting is not infringing and that fair-use requires a balancing of interests which showed that the social benefits outweighed the costs. Id. at 448, 455. 81 This statement does not hold if current incentives for creation are too large. If so, then it might be socially desirable to reduce profit (and the accompanying incentive to create) even if that also means reducing total surplus. See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13 at 95-97.
82 Kaplow looks at the ratio of total surplus change to profit change when formulating an optimal patent policy, see Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1829-39, and Fisher follows the same approach when analyzing the fair use doctrine, see Fisher, supra note 46 at 1706-17. 83 In some markets, valuations also rise because of consumption externalities. A consumption externality implies that a buyer's direct utility rises when the number of other consumers using the product rises. Optimal copyright regulation of sharing must balance the rights of users and sellers. Sellers would be happiest with complete control over sharing, then they could authorize lending, private reproduction, and other activities that contribute to sharing if and only if they increased sellers' profit. But buyers should have the right to share without permission when the sellers' profit incentive is misaligned with the social interest in maximizing total surplus. This might occur when users are excluded from a market by high transaction costs, 85 when sharing undermines inefficient price discrimination, 86 or when buyer coalitions exert countervailing market power that offsets seller market power and increases output.
87
These policy considerations are critical to a proper fair use analysis of sharing. Fair use balances four factors: (1) purpose; (2) nature of the work; (3) amount of the work used; and (4) market effect. 88 Fair use addresses the impact of sharing on incentives for creation through the second and fourth factors. Courts evaluate the nature of a work to see whether it requires strong incentives for creation, and the market effect to identify the impact of sharing on profit. Together these factors lead to a judgment about the impact of sharing on incentives to create. Fair use addresses the impact of sharing on ex post total surplus through the first factor. For example, courts recognize that private copying can be justified as a way to avoid transaction costs. Courts have not considered whether disruption of inefficient price discrimination or creation of countervailing market power are purposes favoring fair use -but the open-ended nature of the balancing test would permit this sort of analysis. Sellers are motivated to control frequency of use because it aids price discrimination. Buyers who use a product more frequently are likely to have a higher valuation and be willing to pay more. Ideally a seller would just ask prospective buyers how frequently they plan to use a product, and then charge more to high frequency users. Of course, buyers may not know the answer to that question at the time of purchase, and they have an incentive to understate their planned usage. Thus, IP owners employ several different strategies to monitor and control frequency of use.
One approach is to control frequency of use directly through contract. A seller could specify an increasing schedule of prices associated with an increasing frequency of permissible use. 89 Contractual use restrictions are difficult to enforce because it is difficult to detect violations. IP law bolsters frequency of use restrictions by adding infringement claims and strong IP remedies to the breach of contract claims. 90 Infringement claims are well grounded in patent law because the patent owner has broad control over use. 91 Copyright law does not offer a comparably broad use right but in some important settings unauthorized use is infringing. Computers (and other consumer electronic devices) usually make a temporary copy of digital content or software during use. Even though temporary, such a copy may be infringing. 92 Thus, a digital copyright owner can sue a buyer who violates a frequency of use restriction for breach of contract, and also for copyright infringement because of the unauthorized temporary reproductions. Copyright law imposes two important limits on these infringement claims. Section 117 gives software owners the right to make copies as an essential step in using a program, 93 and the copyright misuse More commonly, sellers control frequency of use indirectly through the sale of some complementary product that is used with the IP protected product. Sellers require buyers to purchase the complementary product (1) through a tying contract, (2) because of product design, or (3) by threat of an infringement suit against a competing supplier. The classic illustration of contractual tying and price discrimination comes from the antitrust tying case IBM Corp. v. U.S. 95 IBM leased patented tabulator machines on the condition that the lessee purchase all of the punch cards needed for use in the machines from IBM. 96 Punch card purchases measured frequency of use. Rather than charging a rental rate that varied directly with frequency of use, IBM charged a premium over the competitive price for punch cards, and thereby indirectly collected a rental rate that increased with the frequency of use.
97 IBM could have implemented essentially the same pricing scheme by installing a counter on each machine that recorded the number of cards processed, or by requiring lessees to record and report how many cards they used (or some other measure of frequency of use). No doubt they chose the punch card tie because it was less costly and more reliable.
98
Antitrust law treats tying contracts as per se illegal, but actually imposes a relatively mild check. A tying contract is unlawful if: there are truly separate tied and tying products; the seller has market power in the tying product market; and there are anticompetitive effects in the tied product market. 99 Older cases like IBM found ties that appear to implement price discrimination to be unlawful, 100 but recent courts have been quite tolerant. (1917) . Movie projectors were tied to film, and the patent owner derived most of its profit from the sale of film. Id. at 515. 98 A similar fact pattern was described in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The lease of a patented canning machine was tied to the sale of salt tablets. Salt sales meter intensity of use of canning machine. Perhaps the lessor wanted to control the salt used in the leased machines to prevent harm caused by inferior salt. 99 The plaintiff must also show evidence of actual coercion that forced the buyer to accept the tie, and that the tied product market involves interstate commerce. 100 Sellers can use product design to implement a technological rather than a contractual tie. This approach works when the seller offers a system containing two components that interact through an interface that the seller designs so it is difficult for a third party to make a compatible tied product. The tied component is consumed by users and must be replaced frequently. The seller monitors frequency of use through sales of the consumable component. For example, a medical device manufacturer named Bard apparently used the sale of biopsy needles to measure the frequency of use of a gun that inserted the needles. 103 Bard violated Section Two of the Sherman Act by changing the interface between the gun and the needles to exclude other needle manufacturers.
"[T]he great majority of decisions conclude that the simple fact -------------------
104 Section Two of the Sherman Act regulates tying through interface design; there is no basis for Section One oversight because design choices are unilateral. Section Two oversight is significantly limited by the requirement that the defendant possess monopoly power, 105 and by antitrust courts' reluctance to meddle with innovation.
106
IP law regulates the development and creation of product interfaces and thereby facilitates or discourages product design based tying. Patent and trade secret law protect product interfaces. A seller can block all use of a patented interface, but reverse engineering is allowed if the interface is protected as a trade secret. 107 Reverse engineering of software interfaces requires making a copy of the interface software. Sellers have tried to use ------------------- 101 See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6, at §21.2. 102 See id. at §3.1, 3-2 (antitrust and patent misuse are closely linked); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (alleged infringer invoked the doctrine of patent misuse to block enforcement of the patent). Patent misuse is not the same as the equitable doctrine of unclean hands for two reasons: the patentee loses both injunctive remedies and damages; and the whole patent is unenforceable against any infringer. Another, more doubtful, strategy for protecting a product interface is a claim based on Section 1201(a) of the DMCA. That section creates a right prohibiting circumvention of means that control access to copyrighted works. 110 Recently, a printer manufacturer filed a lawsuit in which it seeks to use the DMCA to control the market for replacement ink cartridges.
111
The claim has some plausibility because the software incorporated in the interface is copyrightable subject matter, but there is a strong argument that the lawsuit improperly extends the scope of copyright to the market for replacement ink cartridges and therefore violates the misuse doctrine or antitrust law.
112
The final approach to controlling frequency of use relies on the threat of IP suits against competing suppliers of the tied product. An example in copyright law is presented in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.
113
MAI sold computers containing their copyrighted operating system. They tied maintenance service to the computer by suing Peak, a third party maintenance provider, for copyright infringement. 114 The infringement
The leading case is Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). .Plaintiff Sega makes and sells the Genesis console and video game cartridges. Accolade makes game cartridges that run on different types of consoles. Sega licenses independent game makers but did not license Accolade. Accolade reverse engineered the Sega video game programs to discover the requirements for compatibility and then made compatible game cartridges. The court held that copying and disassembly to discover functional compatibility requirements constitutes a fair use. 109 claim was based on the temporary copy that was made when Peak technicians turned on an MAI computer and the operating system was loaded into RAM. 115 An amendment to the Copyright Act partially overruled this case by adding section 117(c) which allows a software owner or lessee to authorize a RAM copy for the purpose of hardware maintenance or repair.
116
Patent law facilitates ties by allowing contributory infringement suits against competing suppliers of a tied product. 117 For example, Rohm & Haas owned a patent on a method for using an unpatented chemical named propanil as a herbicide. 118 The company effectively tied sale of propanil to a license to practice the method by refusing to license any farmer who obtained propanil from another source. 119 Rohm & Haas sued a competing manufacturer of propanil for contributory infringement. The paramount question was whether the tie was justified as a means of controlling contributory infringement, or instead was a misuse of the patent which would have made the patent unenforceable. Section 271(c) specifies that a person is liable for contributory infringement if they sell a component of a patented machine, or a material for use in practicing a patented process.
120
A critical element of a contributory infringement claim is a showing that the defendant's product is a non-staple, i.e., not suitable for substantial noninfringing use. 121 Propanil was a non-staple since it had no use except to practice the patented method. 122 Ties that serve to deter contributory infringement fall into a safe harbor created in Section 271(d) which assures that such a tie is not misuse. 123 Applying §271(c) and (d) the Court found Dawson Chemical's sale of propanil was contributory patent infringement and there was no patent misuse.
124
The diverse marketing practices discussed in this section are linked by the notion that they can all be used to implement price discrimination based on frequency of use. 125 Many of the normative issues raised in the context of type of use restrictions and price discrimination apply here. For example, the output effect of usage based pricing can be positive or negative. Output based pricing tends to draw new customers into a market, specifically, customers who are infrequent users who are attracted by the relatively low price charged for infrequent use. Consumption tends to fall among current customers who formerly consumed as much as they wanted, and now face a positive price for each additional use. 126 An important and difficult policy issue concerns coordination of antitrust and IP law to channel frequency of use pricing toward socially advantageous implementation methods.
127 Some methods are prohibited by antitrust and misuse law.
128 Sellers committed to usage based pricing will choose the most profitable of the permissible methods; their choice will depend on the way IP law affects the cost of various methods. IP encourages product design ties by protecting interfaces with patents, trade secret law and anti-circumvention law. It discourages design ties by 124 See Dawson Chemical, 448 U.S. at 221-23. 125 The restraints discussed in this section have many other possible uses. Tying arrangements promote efficiency in a variety of ways. They serve a quality control function. See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6 at §21.2a. Information about frequency of use helps a lessor properly maintain leased equipment. Id. at §21.2e. Usage charges help diffuse something economists call the "adverse selection problem." Cite. A potential user who is unsure about the value of a new technology can be reassured by an arrangement that requires payment only if he actually uses the product. Id. Further, strong IP protection of design interfaces allows the producer of the tying product to license competing manufacturers of the tied product and maintain control over the price of the tied product in order to mitigate pricing externalities facing tied product suppliers. See Douglas G. 126 See Meurer Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 125-26. 127 An interesting question is whether the law should encourage IP owners to choose software interfaces to implement metering, because it is cheaper than using physical interfaces.
128 Antitrust law regulates contractual tying more closely than technological tying. See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 6 at §21.5b2 (noting that most ties cannot be challenged under Section One of the Sherman Act, or Section Three of the Clayton Act, and they are difficult to invalidate under Section Two of the Sherman Act). treating reverse engineering as lawful under copyright and trade secret law. 129 Patent law encourages ties involving non-staples and copyright law encourages direct frequency of use pricing by making temporary digital copies infringing. 130 The appropriate scope of the contributory infringement doctrine is another crucial policy issue facing IP law.
131 Liability attaches to defendants who sell a product or component that is not capable of a substantial non-infringing use. The scope of the doctrine can be adjusted by narrow or broad interpretation of the terms capable of and substantial.
132
Broader scope encourages usage based pricing, makes enforcement easier, and increases the value of a patent or copyright. Narrower scope encourages sale of the defendant's product, and reduces rent-seeking IP litigation. The contributory infringement doctrine provides a social benefit by reducing enforcement costs. A process patent, like the one in Dawson Chemical, is difficult to enforce when practice of the process is easy to hide.
133 Patent law eases the enforcement burden for processes that consume a non-staple input (like propanil) because sales of the input are difficult to hide and can be targeted for enforcement action by the patent owner. 134 The doctrine needs to be limited though to prevent overrewarding patentees and shifting too much of the cost of enforcement to third parties. 135 An overly broad doctrine also creates the danger that the
There is a conflict between the circuits regarding contracts that prohibit reverse engineering. The Fifth Circuit preempted a term that prohibited reversed engineering under the copyright statute, see 134 Additional enforcement benefits arise because the patent owner can reduce the number of suits required for effective enforcement and because the smaller profit from suing direct infringers sometimes makes those suits unprofitable. [Common sense: no authority needed.] 135 See C.R. Bard, Inc., v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, 911 F.2d 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (When an item that is sold to the public might have non-infringing as well as infringing uses "the public interest in access to that article is necessarily implicated."); Dogan, supra note 110, at 942 (advocating an approach that focuses on consumer access to markets outside the scope of the copyright); but see seller of a staple product could be exploited through an opportunistic patent or copyright suit.
IV. REPAIR AND MODIFICATION
It is not unusual in IP protected markets for sellers to make strategic decisions about the durability of their products. Naturally, they make product design decisions that affect product durability, but sellers also use vertical restraints to control the economic life of a product. Specifically, they can use contract and IP law to restrict or prohibit user repair or modification -the effect of these restrictions is to stop users from extending the economic life of their products. These restrictions can be profitable in three different ways. First, they help the seller control frequency of use and implement price discrimination. Second, they help the seller suppress the second-hand market. And third, they help the seller maintain a monopoly sales price.
The previous section explained that sellers often use the sale of a tied product to measure the frequency of use of a tying product. Buyers can thwart this strategy by reusing the tied product. Sellers can respond by making it difficult to reuse the tied product. Such a struggle apparently is taking place in the printer market. 137 Printer companies tie the sale of ink cartridges to printers because cartridge sales are a good measure of frequency of use. Printer companies have discouraged third party cartridge suppliers by making it difficult to design a compatible cartridge and by enforcing patent and copyright rights. 138 Buyers responded by simply refilling empty cartridges with ink. Hewlett Packard countered by designing cartridges to be non-refillable. 139 A company named Repeat-OType Stencil purchased HP ink cartridges, modified them so that they could Sellers also limit reuse of a product outside the tying context. Medical device makers often limit buyers to a single use of a product even though the product could be refurbished and reused. 141 The most likely rationale is to discourage the development of a second-hand market.
142 Mallinckrodt v. Medipart 143 featured a patented medical device used to deliver mist to the lungs of patients. The patent owner marked the device: "For Single Use Only." The defendant salvaged used devices, sterilized the main parts and resold them. The court treated the label as a valid contract term and enforced the restriction despite an objection that the restriction violated the exhaustion doctrine.
144
Even if a patent owner fails to impose a contractual restraint on reuse, it can still prohibit certain kinds of reuse that are characterized as infringing reconstruction. In Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons 145 the patent owner sold patented metal bands used to tie bales of cotton. When the cotton bales arrived at the cotton mill the bands were cut. The defendant collected and recycled the bands. The Court held this was infringing reconstruction.
146
When courts want to limit the patent owner's control over reuse they characterize a defendant's actions as repair rather than reconstruction.
147
Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Tech., Inc., 148 illustrates non-infringing repair. The patent covered a medical device that creates pressure used to treat and prevent deep vein thrombosis. The invention comprises a pump, tube, and pressure sleeve. The pressure sleeve is marked: "For Single Use Only." The defendant made and sold replacement sleeves. The combination of the old tube and pump with the replacement sleeves was not reconstruction of the invention, rather it was non-infringing repair.
149
Sellers restrict repair of some patented devices even when tying and second-hard markets are not present. Such restrictions may be necessary to support a high sale price that is predicated on the belief that consumers will return to purchase a replacement from the patent owner when the device they currently own reaches an optimal retirement age. Ideally, a seller should encourage users to properly maintain a device to prolong its life, and discourage inefficient repairs and modifications. A buyer might practice inefficient repair because the seller uses its market power to set the replacement price above the cost of the replacement. 150 This theory justifies certain contractual restrictions on repair and also the practice of characterizing certain activities as infringing reconstruction even though that might easily be characterized as repair instead.
151
In Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E. J. Co., 152 the defendant placed new tips on drill bits covered by plaintiff's drill patent. Even though the drill tip was not separately patented, the court ruled this was infringing reconstruction. 153 The court distinguished and permitted users to sharpen the tip when it becomes dull. 154 The court emphasized that sharpening a
Let me illustrate this result with an example. To keep the story simple, suppose that there are six years remaining in the term of the patent that protects a durable good, and suppose there is no discounting of future costs and benefits. The good provides a benefit of 5 for each year of use. It costs 4 to make a new good, and the good lasts for two years if it is not repaired. The user can repair the good at a cost of 3 and extend its life by one year, so a repaired good lasts a total of three years. In this setting, repair is inefficient because it costs 3 to get a year of service from a good through repair, but only 4/2 = 2 to get a year of service from manufacture of a new good. If the user is not allowed to repair the good, then the patent owner will charge 10 for the good, and a user would make three purchases over the remaining six years of the patent. The patent owner would earn a profit of 10 -4 = 6 on each sale for a total profit of 18 from each user.
If the user is allowed to repair the good, then the seller will earn a smaller total profit, and the user will engage in inefficient repair. At the previous price of 10, a user would only make two purchases instead of three over the remaining patent term. The user would repair the good at the end of the second year by paying the repair cost of 4. By making repairs, the user limits her total costs over the six years to 2(10) + 2(3) = 26, the cost of two purchases and two repairs. This is smaller than the cost of three purchases, and it delivers the same benefit. If the patent owner charged a price of 10 it would get a profit from each user of 12 not 18, because it would make two sales not three. The patent owner actually maximizes its profit by raising the price to 12. Users make two purchases and perform two repairs. The patent owner earns a profit of 12 -4 = 8 on each sale for a total profit of 16 from each user. If the patent owner wanted to induce users to make three purchases and forego inefficient repair, it would have to cut the price to 6. But the patent owner would not choose such a low price because it gives a profit of only 6-4 = 2 on each sale for a total profit of 6 from each user. Software publishers often prohibit software modification; this vertical restraint prevents users from extending the economic life of the software and may have a similar effect to restraints on the repair of patented products.
157 Some users modify software so they can add new features or move it to a new platform. 158 The seller might prefer the user buy a new version of the software rather than modify an old version. The adaptation right in copyright law applies to software modifications and makes them infringing, 159 but the right is significantly constrained by Section 117 160 and the fair use doctrine. 161 Despite these limitations on the adaptation right, contract terms that restrict modification are likely to be enforced. 162 Vertical restraints affecting repair and modification help sellers control the economic life of their products. Policy analysis of these restraints raises two interesting questions. First, do the restraints promote efficient repair and modification or instead wasteful obsolescence? And second, are the restraints necessary to assure IP owners capture an adequate reward in durable product markets? IP owners would argue that restraints on reconstruction encourage efficient repair, and help support the high profit level required to induce innovation. The ability to block reuse eases the threat of competition from the secondary market. 163 The ability to control effective product life helps sellers escape a curse on durable product monopolists that prevents them from charging a monopoly price. Ronald Coase conjectured, and microeconomists later confirmed, that durable product monopolists have trouble sustaining a price above the competitive price, because they have trouble committing themselves not to price discriminate over time. 164 The prospect that price will fall over time, discourages high valuation consumers from making an early purchase at a high price, and thus the seller's inability to commit to a high price leads to a relatively low initial price. One solution requires the seller to convert the durable product into a perishable product. 165 Commitment to charge a high price is no longer a problem because high valuation users are repeatedly in the market along with all other users. The restraints discussed in this section have the effect of making products less durable, and they might be motivated by a desire to escape the Coase conjecture. 166 IP users would object that some restraints on repair and modification are socially harmful. These arguments are plausible in cases in which a second-hand market would increase output or when inefficient product life choices are made to overcome the Coase conjecture or support frequency of use pricing or some other form of price discrimination. 167 To make these objections convincing IP users should also argue that profit and incentive to innovate would not be harmed too much by constraining repair and modification restraints.
V. PACKAGES
IP owners sometimes insist that buyers and licensees take a package of ------------------- 163 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 79-80 (1988) (the size of the profit to the monopolist depends on how the ease of recycling). 164 be reduced as patents in the package expire. 184 Patent law preempts contract terms that purport to require royalties on an invalid patent. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 185 Lear licensed a patented gyroscope from Adkins. Lear stopped making royalty payments because it believed the patent was invalid, and Adkins brought suit. The Supreme Court overturned a contract doctrine that estopped licensees from challenging the validity of a patent because patent law preempted the contract doctrine. Later cases extended preemption to various contract terms that discourage validity challenges. 186 In copyright protected markets important policy concerns arise with exit restraints that are directed upstream at creators. An interesting example comes from the player piano industry. In early twentieth century America piano rolls were a major source of revenue for the music industry. 187 A firm named the Aeolian Company dominated the market for piano rolls and for player pianos. 188 In the first decade of the century, Aeolian signed deals with several music publishers that granted Aeolian the exclusive right to make piano rolls using the songs in their catalogues. 189 Interestingly, these contracts were negotiated when the player piano was a relatively new technology, and there was uncertainty whether piano roll makers needed copyright permission. The Aeolian contracts were contingent on the courts or Congress establishing that piano rolls were subject to music composition copyrights. The Supreme Court decided piano rolls were not infringing copies because they were not fixed within the meaning of the 1870 Copyright Act. 190 Composers and music publishers lobbied Congress to make piano rolls subject to copyright law, and partially succeeded; Congress extended copyright law to cover mechanical reproductions of music. 191 Player piano and piano roll competitors of Aeolian also lobbied Congress seeking relief from the market power Aeolian would get from its exclusive contracts. Congress responded by combining the mechanical reproduction right with a compulsory license provision that effectively nullified the exclusionary term in the Aeolian contracts. 192 IP regulation of exit restraints presents the same basic policy concerns presented by antitrust regulation. 193 Certain exit restraints are used to deter entry or raise the costs of competing with the firm that imposes the restraints, but most exit restraints advance some efficiency goal. 194 The difficult question is how to deter harmful restraints without discouraging efficient restraints. For example, restraints like those in Brulotte might have an anti-competitive effect similar to certain long-term requirements contracts, 195 or they might simply implement a convenient payment method for liquidity constrained users. 196 Similarly, restrictions on challenges to the validity of a patent might preserve an entry barrier based on an invalid patent, but they also promote efficient settlement of litigation. 197 The compulsory licensing approach used in copyright is quite difficult to manage effectively because of the twin problems of deciding when a compulsory license is appropriate, and fixing an appropriate royalty rate. 198 
CONCLUSION
IP law is much more active than antitrust law in regulating vertical restraints in IP protected markets. 199 Vertical restraints are implemented through contract, IP enforcement, and product design. Antitrust regulates vertical restraints by condemning contract terms that are judged anticompetitive. IP law often takes a similar approach, condemning certain contract terms through application of the misuse and preemption doctrines. But IP law has additional means of influencing contract based restrictions. It encourages vertical restrictions by bolstering contract remedies with IP remedies when a user violates a use restriction, and it provides default terms to fill incomplete contracts. Furthermore, IP facilitates vertical restraints by granting IP rights against strangers who might interfere with the restraints by playing the role of arbitrageur or materially assisting an act of infringement. IP law inevitably must be more active than antitrust in regulating vertical restraints -the law must specify rules about what kinds -------------------
